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DE FINETTI’S THEOREM IN CATEGORICAL PROBABILITY
TOBIAS FRITZ*, TOMÁŠ GONDA, AND PAOLO PERRONE

Abstract. We present a novel proof of de Finetti’s Theorem characterizing permutation-invariant probability measures of infinite sequences of variables, so-called exchangeable measures. The proof is phrased in the language
of Markov categories, which provide an abstract categorical framework for
probability and information flow. The diagrammatic and abstract nature of
the arguments makes the proof intuitive and easy to follow. We also show
how the usual measure-theoretic version of de Finetti’s Theorem for standard
Borel spaces is an instance of this result.

1. Introduction
De Finetti’s Theorem states that every permutation-invariant joint probability
distribution of countably many random variables is such that these variables are
conditionally independent given a suitable latent variable. Moreover, a canonical
choice of the latent variable is the empirical distribution of the variables under
consideration (which exists almost surely). In this paper, we state and prove a more
abstract version of de Finetti’s Theorem in the context of categorical probability
theory, which is a nascent framework for a foundation of probability and statistics
that is more abstract and more general than the traditional measure-theoretic
approach.
Context of de Finetti’s Theorem. To provide some context for and illustrate
the significance of de Finetti’s Theorem, it is helpful to consider the notoriously
divisive debate on the subjective vs. objective view on probability [21, 32]. For our
purposes, note that there are situations in which it is commonly presumed that
one can give objective meaning to probability and infer its value. For example,
flipping a coin and counting the relative frequency of ‘heads’ among the trials
ought to converge to the bias of the coin. This is the content of the law of large
numbers.
However, there is no free lunch and the assumption that the objective probability exists is crucial in the above reasoning. As de Finetti eloquently argues in
Section 3 of [11], from the subjectivist point of view,
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“nothing obliges us to choose [probability of heads in the next toss]
to be close to the frequency [of heads in the previously observed
tosses].”
Let us give a brief account of the argument here and refer to de Finetti’s classic
[11] for more details.
In the coin-flipping experiment, suppose that we are given a (subjective) joint
probability distribution over possible sequences of heads and tails. If the coin
had an associated bias that does not change from one trial to the next, we would
expect the outcomes of different trials to be conditionally independent, given the
knowledge of the bias. In such case, however, the bias is an (objective) property
of the coin that corresponds to the probabilities that the coin lands heads or tails
respectively. On the flip side, it is unclear how to justify trial independence without
implicitly bringing in the assumption of objective probability. Nevertheless, we
may require that the joint distribution is unchanged under permutations of the
different trials, a property known as exchangeability 1 which expresses the belief
that these are trials of the “same phenomenon”.
De Finetti shows that with respect to any exchangeable probability measure,
the individual trials are conditionally independent given some random variable Y .
Moreover, there is a canonical choice for Y whose values precisely correspond to
the possible biases of the coin, so that (in this example) Y takes values in the
unit interval [0, 1]. De Finetti’s Theorem thus justifies the use of probability distributions in the subjectivist conception, since it says that exchangeable behaviors
(of infinitely many trials) are indistinguishable from the behaviors of a repeated
flipping of a coin with unknown, but fixed, bias.
Indeed, one can easily see that flipping a coin with an unknown bias, distributed
according to some probability measure on Y , leads to a distribution of sequences
of heads and tails that is exchangeable. The non-trivial part of de Finetti’s Theorem is in the converse. It says that, given a countable number of trials, every
exchangeable distribution arises in this way.
Historically speaking, the above context is the one in which the topic of our
paper—de Finetti’s Theorem—originates. However, besides its implications for the
foundations of the concept of probability, the result also bears significance for
the development of nonparametric Bayesian modelling [24, 31]. More concretely,
many natural stochastic processes—such as drawing with replacement (e.g. the
Pólya urn model and modifications thereof) or without replacement—give rise to
exchangeable distributions. By de Finetti’s Theorem, they can be equivalently
described as drawing a random probability distribution q according to a specified
prior distribution over distributions, µ (e.g. a Dirichlet process), and subsequently
drawing independent samples from q. In other words, they correspond to a mixture
of iid (independent and identically distributed) samplings, which is useful both as
an aid for intuitive understanding and for concrete calculations.

1
Exchangeable measures are occasionally also called “symmetric” or “equivalent”, see the translator’s note of [11].
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Existing proofs and variants of de Finetti’s Theorem. The original proofs
by de Finetti in the binary case (as in coin-flipping) can be found in [10, 11], while a
more general result is due to Hewitt and Savage [22], who have shown the analogous
statement for exchangeable Radon probability measures on compact Hausdorff
spaces. We give more details on the measure-theoretic formulation for standard
Borel spaces in Section 2. Since then, many proofs based on different methods
have appeared in various contexts. For instance, those of [26, Theorem 11.10] and
[4, Theorem 3.1] use the mean ergodic theorem and conditional expectations; in
[29, Theorem 12.17] and [3, Theorem 3.1] one arrives at the result via backwards
martingales; while harmonic [30] and non-standard [2] analysis have also been
used. The latter has recently led to a new generalization of de Finetti’s Theorem
for exchangeable Radon measures on any Hausdorff space [1]. Functional analysis
and moment methods have been utilized in the proof from [15, Chapter VII],
whose more elementary and explicitly calculational version that applies to binary
variables can be found in [28].
Very recently, Jacobs and Staton [23] have presented a category-theoretic approach to de Finetti’s Theorem, different from the present one, for the binary case.
Therein, the statement of de Finetti’s Theorem is encoded in the fact that the unit
interval—the space of probability distributions—arises as the categorical limit of a
sequence of multisets over {0, 1} (“urns”) related by morphisms that represent the
action of drawing a random element from an urn without replacement.
Our version of de Finetti’s Theorem. In Section 4, we present an abstract
version of de Finetti’s Theorem as a statement about morphisms in categories
which admit notions of parallel composition, swapping, copying, and discarding,
called Markov categories [17]. The framework of Markov categories is very general,
and there are many Markov categories in which de Finetti’s Theorem does not hold.
Correspondingly, there are additional axioms that enter as ingredients in the proof
of our abstract version of de Finetti’s Theorem. Specifically, they correspond to
the fact that one should be able to
• construct conditional probabilities,
• describe distributions on spaces of probability distributions, and
• consider countable sequences of trials.
These three requirements will be stated formally in Assumption 4.2, after introducing the basics of the formalism of Markov categories in Section 3. Within a
Markov category that satisfies them, one therefore obtains a version of de Finetti’s
Theorem. As we show in Section 4, the measure-theoretic version for discrete and
continuous random variables (described by standard Borel spaces) arises in this
way as well. Additionally, we automatically get a characterization of exchangeable
Markov kernels, unlike the classical results that focus exclusively on exchangeable
measures. As far as we know, this result has not appeared in the literature before.
It is likely that other Markov categories also have the required properties, and
that instantiating the abstract de Finetti’s Theorem in those leads to a context
in which the result would be entirely new. However, we do not know of any such
examples at present and leave the search for these to future investigations.
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Synthetic probability theory. The process described above—identifying abstract results that follow from properties expressed within the framework and
instantiating them in concrete Markov categories—is an example of the synthetic
approach to probability theory, which is distinguished from the standard analytic
one in terms of measure theory by encapsulating measure-theoretic statements
in suitable higher-level axioms [17]. It differs from standard approaches by using
more formal and abstract reasoning and it only depends on the particular measuretheoretic semantics insofar as the synthetic axioms may or may not be satisfied.
A number of concepts and theorems of classical probability and statistics have
been given a synthetic treatment in recent years [7, 17, 19, 18]. We recall the ones
relevant for de Finetti’s Theorem in Section 3.
The proof that we present in Section 5 is inspired by several of the concrete
ones mentioned above, but as far as we know it does not match either of them
completely. Its abstract nature, which places the focus on essential aspects while
allowing us to ignore irrelevant details, arguably makes it easier to follow than
any measure-theoretic one, although it is still far from obvious. The proof relies
on the graphical calculus of string diagrams, which captures several non-trivial
properties implicitly and whose connectivity explicitly depicts information flow.
It is these two features that enable one to readily interpret any stage of the proof
with relative ease, once some familiarity with the diagrammatic notation has been
obtained.
Outlook. Given the intuitive nature of our proof, it is natural to hope that even
deeper results can be proven along similar lines in a purely synthetic manner,
and that one can ultimately aim at proving new statements that would be too
difficult to obtain in the traditional measure-theoretic formalism due to its higher
complexity. With this in mind, it may be worth mentioning a few extensions of
de Finetti’s Theorem which one can try to aim at next.
Among the most interesting variations on the exchangeability theme is arguably
the notion of partial exchangeability [14], where the invariance under finite permutation invariance is relaxed to invariance under certain structure-preserving
permutations. For example, the Aldous–Hoover Theorem [3, 4] characterizes exchangeable arrays of random variables and is closely related to random graphs.
There is a similar result for Markov chains [12, 13, 6]. More recently, partial
exchangeability has been generalized to hierarchical exchangeability [5, 25]. The
work of Crane and Towsner provides perhaps the most general currently available
results along these lines [8, 9], situated in a model-theoretic framework.
2. Measure-Theoretic Version of de Finetti’s Theorem
Let us turn to a more formal exposition of de Finetti’s Theorem in standard
measure-theoretic language. Given a measurable space X, consider the product
X N of countably many copies of X, equipped with the product σ-algebra. A
bijection N → N which fixes all elements apart from a finite subset is called a
finite permutation. Given a finite permutation σ : N → N, we denote by nσ ∈ N
the largest natural number not fixed by σ.
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Consider a probability measure p on X N . By convention, given a finite collection
of measurable subsets S1 , . . . , Sn ⊆ X, we write
p(S1 × · · · × Sn )
as shorthand for the probability of the “cylinder” event
p(S1 × · · · × Sn × X × X × . . .).
These probabilities specify the marginal distribution of p on the first n components
of X N . We say that the measure p is exchangeable if for every finite permutation
σ and for every finite sequence of measurable subsets S1 , . . . , Snσ ⊆ X, we have

(1)
p(S1 × · · · × Snσ ) = p Sσ(1) × · · · × Sσ(nσ ) .
As we saw in the introduction, a somewhat trivial example of exchangeable measures is given by product measures, i.e., ones satisfying
q(S1 × · · · × Sn ) = q(S1 ) × · · · × q(Sn ).

(2)

Such a product measure q constitutes the law of a sequence of iid random variables.
Having introduced the notion of exchangeability, we now turn to de Finetti’s
Theorem itself. A convenient way to express the statement, which lends itself well
to category-theoretical translations, is to use the concept of measures on a space
of measures, as done by Hewitt and Savage [22, Section 2] among others. If X is a
standard Borel space, we denote by P X the set of probability measures on X. The
set P X can be equipped with a canonical σ-algebra, namely the one generated by
the functions εf : P X → R given by
Z
p 7→ f (x) p(dx)
for all bounded measurable functions f : X → R. Measures on P X (thus elements
of P P X) can be thought of as random measures on X, where also the specific
form of the distribution is subject to uncertainty.2
Equivalently, measures on P X describe mixtures of measures—either in the
sense of finite convex combinations or integrals. Indeed, de Finetti’s Theorem can
be summarized as the fact that exchangeable measures are mixtures of product
measures. Here is the precise statement, in the version for standard Borel spaces.
Theorem 2.1 (de Finetti’s Theorem). Let X be a standard Borel space. A probability measure p on X N is exchangeable if and only if there exists a probability measure µ on P X such that for every finite collection of measurable subsets
S1 , . . . , Sn ⊆ X, we have
Z
p(S1 × · · · × Sn ) =
q(S1 ) × · · · × q(Sn ) µ(dq).
(3)
PX

For example, the iid case amounts to µ being a delta measure δr ∈ P P X for
some r ∈ P X satisfying p = rN . On the other hand, if µ is a random measure
supported on the set {δx }x∈X of delta measures δx ∈ P X, then we obtain p
2Such recursive ways of forming spaces can often be accurately captured by the categorical
notion of a monad, and indeed these spaces of measures can be described in terms of a well-known
monad, the Giry monad [20].
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supported on the diagonal—i.e., the set of constant sequences in X N . In other
words, the associated exchangeable random variables are then perfectly correlated.
By convex analysis arguments, it can also be shown that given p as in Theorem 2.1, the measure µ is uniquely determined. Note that the result due to Hewitt
and Savage [22] is more general than the one above, as it applies to Radon probability measures on arbitrary compact Hausdorff spaces. It includes the uniqueness
of µ as well.
3. Markov Categories
We now take a detour from the discussion of de Finetti’s Theorem into the
realm of Markov categories. All of the concepts defined in this section have been
introduced in earlier works on categorical probability [7, 17, 19, 18]. Nevertheless,
in the interest of a self-contained presentation, we recall the main points here in a
slightly less formal way, referring to the existing literature for full technical detail.
As mentioned in the introduction, a Markov category is a category that comes
with notions of parallel composition, swapping, copying, and discarding. The idea
is that contexts in which one wants to model flow of information will generally
satisfy these basic requirements and thus correspond to a Markov category. In
particular, one would expect that any formalisation of classical probability theory
does. However, there are also many Markov categories that have nothing to do
with probability theory (see [17]).
One of the simplest interesting examples to keep in mind is FinStoch, the category of finite sets and stochastic matrices. An object in FinStoch is a finite set,
which can be interpreted as the set of possible values of a random variable. A morphism, say f : A → X, assigns a probability measure on the finite set X to each
element of the finite set A. It can thus be described as a stochastic matrix with
entries f (x|a) indexed by a ∈ A and x ∈ X. Parallel composition of two stochastic
maps, f : A → X and g : B → Y , is just their tensor product f ⊗g : A⊗B → X ⊗Y ,
where A ⊗ B is the cartesian product of the underlying sets and one multiplies
the probabilities in the formation of the tensor product. On the other hand, the
sequential composition of f : A → X and h : X → Z to produce h ◦ f : A → Z is
given by the usual matrix multiplication. In the context of stochastic maps, it is
also known as the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation.
In the string diagrammatic notation that we make heavy use of, objects are
depicted as ‘wires’, while morphisms are generally drawn as ‘boxes’, with their domain below and their codomain above the box depicted as incident wires. Parallel
and sequential composition is depicted by
Z
X

Y

f

g

A

B

h
and
f
A

respectively.
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We depict morphisms m : I → X from the monoidal unit as
X
m
with the interpretation being that they represent “random states”. For example,
in FinStoch these are the finitely supported probability measures, i.e. probability
distributions.
Swapping X ⊗ Y → Y ⊗ X is implemented by assigning to each pair (x, y) ∈
X × Y the delta distribution δ(y,x) on the pair (y, x) ∈ Y × X. Diagrammatically,
we depict such a swap as
Y
X

X
Y
Copying and discarding in FinStoch are likewise as one would expect. Specifically,
copyX : X → X ⊗ X is a morphism that assigns, to each element x, the delta
distribution δ(x,x) on the pair (x, x) ∈ X ⊗ X. Discarding, delX : X → I, is the
stochastic map that corresponds to marginalization over X, where I denotes a fixed
single-element set. Thus to each element of X, the stochastic map delX assigns
the unique probability measure on I. Diagrammatically, we represent these maps
as
X
X
copyX

=

=

delX

X
X
where we implicitly make use of X ⊗ I ∼
=X∼
= I ⊗ X, so that I need not be drawn
explicitly.
Abstracting these properties along with corresponding compatibility requirements leads to the notion of Markov category. For a more detailed discussion of
the definition and its formal aspects, we refer the reader to [17].
Definition 3.1 (Markov category [17, Definition 2.1]). A Markov category C
is a symmetric monoidal category where the monoidal unit object I is a terminal object,3 every object X ∈ C is equipped with distinguished morphisms
copyX : X → X ⊗X and delX : X → I that make X into a commutative comonoid,
and such that
X ⊗Y
X ⊗Y
X
Y
X
Y

=

X ⊗Y
holds for all X, Y ∈ C.

(4)

X

Y

3This means that for every object X in C there is a unique morphism X → I.
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Example 3.2. As far as this paper is concerned, the most relevant example is
that of BorelStoch, which is the category of standard Borel spaces and measurable
Markov kernels. It extends the objects of FinStoch by including both countably
infinite measurable spaces as well as those isomorphic to [0, 1] with its Borel σalgebra. Morphisms coincide with those of FinStoch on finite sets, but in general
they are given by Markov kernels. That is, a morphism f : A → X is specified
by a family of probability measures f ( |a) over X, one for each a ∈ A, such
that f (S| ) : A → [0, 1] is a measurable map for every measurable subset S ⊆ X.
Sequential composition of Markov kernels f : A → X and h : X → Z is given by
the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation as usual, which in our notation reads
Z
(h ◦ f )(T |a) =
h(T |x) f (dx|a)
(5)
X

for every a ∈ A and every measurable T ⊆ Z. For more details, see [17, Section
4].
3.1. Conditionals. In the introduction, we mentioned that one of the ingredients in our synthetic proof of de Finetti’s Theorem is the existence of conditional
probability distributions. Let us make this more precise in the context of Markov
categories. In FinStoch, given a stochastic matrix f : A → X ⊗ Y with entries
f (x, y|a), there is also a stochastic matrix f|X (y|x, a) satisfying
f (x, y|a)
0
y 0 f (x, y |a)

f|X (y|x, a) = P

(6)

P
whenever the denominator y0 f (x, y 0 |a) is non-zero, and taking arbitrary values
otherwise. This gives the corresponding probability of Y = y given that A and
X attain values a and x, respectively. Equation (6) can be viewed as a version of
Bayes’ Theorem. One can also characterize f|X implicitly by
X
f (x, y|a) = f|X (y|x, a)
f (x, y 0 |a)
(7)
y0

which, unlike equation (6), can be expressed in string diagrams.
Definition 3.3 (conditionals [17, Definition 11.5]). Let f : A → X ⊗ Y be a
morphism in a Markov category C. A morphism f|X : X ⊗ A → Y in C is called a
conditional of f with respect to X if the equation
X

Y
f|X

X Y
f

=

f

(8)

A
A
holds. We say that C has conditionals if such a conditional exists for all morphisms
f : A → X ⊗ Y for any objects A, X, Y in C.
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In BorelStoch, this amounts to the existence of regular conditional probabilities
for measurable Markov kernels [18, Example 2.4].
As a special case of conditionals, we obtain a synthetic definition of a Bayesian
inverse of f : A → X with respect to a prior m : I → A.
Definition 3.4 (Bayesian inverse [7]). Given two morphisms m : I → A and
f : A → X, a Bayesian inverse of f with respect to m is a conditional of
A

X
f
(9)
m

with respect to X. Explicitly, it is a morphism f † : X → A satisfying
A

X

A

f

f†

X

=

(10)

m

f
m

For example in FinStoch, such a Bayesian inverse f † : X → A satisfies
X
f † (a|x)
f (x|a0 ) m(a0 ) = f (x|a) m(a)

(11)

a0

In general, one should keep in mind that even though we denote a Bayesian inverse of f by f † , it does depend non-trivially on the prior m. Moreover, conditionals and Bayesian inverses are generally not unique
P when they exist. In FinStoch,
this is because f|X (y|x, a) is arbitrary whenever y f (x, y|a) = 0 in equation (7).
However, one can show that conditionals (and therefore also Bayesian inverses)
are unique up to almost sure equality [17, Proposition 13.6].
Definition 3.5 (a.s.-equality [7]). Given m : Θ → A, we say that f, g : A → X are
m-almost surely equal, denoted by f =m-a.s. g, if we have
A

X

A

X
g

f
=

(12)

m

m

Θ

Θ

We can interpret equation (12) as saying that f and g can only differ for events
that are deemed irrelevant by m. For example, in BorelStoch, f and g are m-a.s.
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equal if and only if they are equal with probability 1 for every value of Θ, i.e. if
and only if
Z
Z
f (T |a) m(da|θ) =
g(T |a) m(da|θ)
(13)
S

S

holds for all θ ∈ Θ and for all measurable subsets S of A and T of X respectively.

3.2. Representability. Second on our list of proof ingredients is the ability to
express a space of distributions on an object in a Markov category C as an object
in C itself. For example, given an object X = {0, 1} in BorelStoch, we would
like there be an object P X isomorphic to [0, 1] whose elements are themselves
probability distributions over X. Indeed, BorelStoch allows for such a construction
[18, Example 3.19]. However, this is not the case for FinStoch of course since P X
cannot be a finite set.
Before stating the general definition of P X more formally, we need to address
the question of how to refer to “elements” of an object in a Markov category. After
all, the objects do not come equipped with any underlying set a priori. In FinStoch,
we can identify the finite set X with those morphisms I → X that are delta distributions. That is, they are morphisms describing no randomness—the deterministic
ones. More generally, deterministic morphisms in FinStoch are the {0, 1}-valued
stochastic matrices. Intuitively, a deterministic f can be characterized by the fact
that applying it to two independent copies of its input is guaranteed to result in
the same pair of output values as applying f directly to the input and copying its
output.
Definition 3.6 (deterministic morphism [17, Definition 10.1]). Let f : A → X be
a morphism in C. We say that f is deterministic if it satisfies:
X

X

f

f

X

X

=

(14)
f

A

A

The subcategory of C that consists of its deterministic morphisms is denoted by
Cdet .
Indeed, condition (14) fails for every stochastic matrix that is not {0, 1}-valued.
Besides deterministic morphisms, we will also make use of the concept of m-almost
surely deterministic ones.
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Definition 3.7 (a.s.-deterministic morphism [17, Definition 13.11]). A morphism
f in C is m-almost surely deterministic if it satisfies:
X
X A
X
X A
f

f
=

f

(15)

m

m

Θ
Θ
Given Definition 3.6, we thus identify “elements” of the hypothetical space of
distributions P X with deterministic morphisms I → P X. In order for these
to faithfully represent probability distributions on X (and nothing else), in the
general categorical setting we therefore require there to be a bijection between
C(I, X) and Cdet (I, P X). Extending this requirement to morphisms with arbitrary
domain A, which is expected to hold by the same reasoning, leads to the definition
of distribution objects.
Definition 3.8 (representable Markov category [18, Definition 3.7]). Given an
object X in a Markov category C, a distribution object for X is an object P X
together with natural bijections4
∼ Cdet (A, P X)
C(A, X) =
(16)
between morphisms into X and deterministic morphisms into P X. Given any
morphism f : A → X, we denote by f ] : A → P X its counterpart under this
bijective correspondence. We say that C is representable if every object of C has
a distribution object.
It turns out that a slightly stronger version of representability is needed in
the synthetic proof of de Finetti’s Theorem. In particular, we require that the
identification from (16) is compatible with a.s.-equality in the following sense.
Definition 3.9 (a.s.-compatible representability [18, Definition 3.18]). A representable Markov category C is called a.s.-compatibly representable if we have
X
X
PX
PX
f

=m-a.s.

g

⇐⇒

A
A
for all m : Θ → A and all f, g as indicated.

f]

=m-a.s.

A

g]

(17)

A

For example, BorelStoch is a.s.-compatibly representable [18, Example 3.19].
If we set A = P X in bijection (16), we get a correspondence between deterministic morphisms P X → P X and generic morphisms P X → X. The identity
4The bijections being natural refers to the property that the functions instantiating them for

different choices of A make up the components of a natural isomorphism.
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on P X corresponds to a map P X → X which we denote by samp, and which we
can think of as taking a probability distribution p on X and returning a random
element of X distributed according to p (hence, “sampling” from p). In BorelStoch,
for instance, for every p ∈ P X and every measurable S ⊆ X we have
samp(S|p) = p(S).

(18)

By naturality of the bijection (16), for each morphism f : A → X we have that
f = samp ◦ f ] holds. For more details on this, see [18, Section 3].
3.3. Infinite Products. The third and last ingredient that we need in the proof
of our synthetic de Finetti’s Theorem is the ability to construct countable products
of objects. Once again we would not expect FinStoch to allow those, since its
objects are merely finite sets, but BorelStoch does [19, Example 3.6]. The relevant
definition is that of Kolmogorov products introduced in [19] in the context of 0/1laws for Markov categories.
Given a hypothetical object X N describing the product of countably many
copies of X, every probability measure f : I → X N should give rise to a corresponding measure fF : I → X F for each finite subset F ⊆ N. Intuitively, fF is
given by marginalizing over those copies of X indexed by the set complement of
F . Therefore, we might expect there to be a corresponding deterministic morphism πF : X N → X F , which gives fF when composed with f . Conversely, the
Kolmogorov extension theorem suggests that one can reconstruct f uniquely from
its family of finite marginals (fF ), provided that these are suitably compatible.
That is to say, if F 0 ⊆ F is a further subset, then one can obtain fF 0 from fF by
marginalizing over the extraneous copies of X. Under this condition, there should
be a unique f such that fF = πF ◦ f for all F .
The idea underlying Kolmogorov products is to turn these properties that one
would expect from a countable product into a definition of a meaningful product of infinitely many objects in any Markov category. However, besides merely
morphisms of type I → X N , we also require similar properties of those with a
non-trivial domain A and an additional codomain Y that could be correlated with
X N.
Definition 3.10 (Kolmogorov powers [19, Definition 4.1]). Given an object X
in a Markov category C, consider an object X N of C such that there is a natural
bijection between
• morphisms f in C(A, X N ⊗ Y ) and
• families (fF : A → X F ⊗ Y ) of morphisms indexed by finite subsets F of
N that are compatible in the sense that whenever F 0 is a subset of F , we
have
0
0
Y
Y
XF
XF
πF,F 0
fF 0

=

(19)
fF

A

A
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where πF,F 0 : X F → X F acts as the identity on X F and applies delX to
each of the remaining factors,
for all objects A and Y of C. If every morphism in the family (fF ) corresponding
to the case of Y = I, A = X N , and f = idX N is deterministic, then X N is termed
a countable Kolmogorov power of X.
For example, Kolmogorov’s extension theorem (in the countable case) states
that countable Kolmogorov powers exist in BorelStoch [19, Example 3.6].
Note that the family of morphisms that corresponds to id : X N → X N under the
prescribed bijection is given by the “infinite marginalization maps” πF : X N → X F
mentioned before, which play the role of product projections.
If the Kolmogorov powers X N and Y N exist for two objects X and Y , then
for any morphism f : X → Y we get a canonical morphism X N → Y N as follows.
First, for each finite subset F ⊂ N we form the map f F : X F → Y F as usual. The
family of compositions
XN

πF

XF

fF

YF

for each F , by the bijection of Definition 3.10, corresponds to a unique morphism
X N → Y N . We denote this morphism by f N .
Although the original definition in [19] defines Kolmogorov products of any
arbitrarily large family of objects, in the present context we limit ourselves to
countable powers of one and the same object, since this is all we need for de
Finetti’s Theorem.
In the following sections, we use double wires in order to distinguish an object
that is a countable Kolmogorov power (such as X N ) from a generic object of a
Markov category (such as X) depicted by a single wire. See equation (20) for
example. At times, we also use three dots to indicate a countable Kolmogorov
power, such as in equation (21). The latter notation is motivated by the fact that
a countable Kolmogorov power f N of a morphism f can be informally viewed as a
countable number of parallel morphisms, each given by f .
4. De Finetti’s Theorem for Markov Categories
Suppose that a Markov category C has countable Kolmogorov powers. We
can then express what it means for a morphism with a countable power X N as
codomain to be exchangeable. Note that for any injective function i : N → N (and
in particular for any permutation) we can define a morphism X i : X N → X N that
maps the n-th component in X N to
• the i−1 (n)-th component of X N whenever n is in the image of i, and
• discards it otherwise.
The construction of X i is by the definition of X N as the Kolmogorov power of X.
That is, X i corresponds to the family of morphisms (XFi : X N → X F ) as in Definition 3.10, where XFi is the composite of the product projection πi(F ) : X N → X i(F )
with the canonical isomorphism X i(F ) ∼
= X F resulting from identifying the factors
as prescribed by i.
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Definition 4.1 (exchangeability). A morphism p : A → X N is said to be exchangeable if it is invariant under finite permutations of the components of the
Kolmogorov power X N . That is, we demand that for every finite permutation
σ : N → N, we have
Xσ

p

=

(20)
p

Assumption 4.2. Unless stated otherwise, throughout the rest of this paper we
assume that C is a Markov category that:
(1) has conditionals,
(2) is a.s.-compatibly representable, and
(3) has countable Kolmogorov powers.
Note that Assumption 4.2 implies, in particular, that for every object X, the
space (P X)N exists, and is equipped with a copy map (P X)N → (P X)N ⊗ (P X)N .
Example 4.3. BorelStoch satisfies these assumptions. The relevant arguments
can be found in [27, Theorem 1.25], [18, Example 3.19], and [19, Example 3.6]
respectively.
Theorem 4.4 (synthetic de Finetti’s Theorem). Let C be a Markov category satisfying Assumption 4.2. Then a morphism p : A → X N in C is exchangeable if and
only if there is a morphism µ : A → P X such that we have
···
p

samp

···

=

samp
(21)

µ
In particular, this result says that the outputs of p are conditionally independent and identically distributed. As we will see in the proof, the conditioning
here is with respect to a synthetic version of the tail σ-algebra, thereby reproducing this classical aspect of de Finetti’s Theorem as well. In fact, the proof uses
an abstract version of the well-known result of measure-theoretic probability that
the exchangeable σ-algebra and the tail σ-algebra coincide up to sets of measure
zero [29, Corollary 12.18]. In the following synthetic version of this result, the
role of these σ-algebras is played by all possible ways of “probing” joint distributions of X N by composing with a deterministic (or almost surely deterministic)
morphism f .
Proposition 4.5. Let C be a Markov category with conditionals and countable Kolmogorov powers. Let p : A → X N be exchangeable, and suppose that f : X N → Y
is p-a.s. deterministic. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) Finite permutation invariance: For every finite permutation σ, we have
f =p-a.s. f ◦ X σ .

(22)
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(2) Shift invariance: For the successor function s : N → N mapping n to n + 1,
we have
f =p-a.s. f ◦ X s .
(23)
The successor function can be equivalently defined as the inclusion of the second
component in the coproduct decomposition N ∼
= 1 + N and we depict its action on
the Kolmogorov power X N by either of the two following string diagrams:
Xs

=

This morphism effectively discards the first component of X N .
Remark 4.6. While Theorem 4.4 captures the key part of de Finetti’s Theorem
characterizing exchangeable morphisms, we have not been able to prove that our
assumptions imply the uniqueness of the “de Finetti measure” µ in equation (21).
This property is often proven as part of classical versions of de Finetti’s Theorem
including the one of Hewitt and Savage for compact Hausdorff spaces [22].
Here is how we can use Theorem 4.4 to obtain the classical de Finetti’s Theorem
in the form of Theorem 2.1. First of all, we take as C the category BorelStoch,
which satisfies the relevant assumptions. Moreover, since the usual statement
is given for the case of probability measures as opposed to Markov kernels with
nontrivial domain, it suffices to consider the case of A = I.
Then the left-hand side of equation (21) instantiated in our case is an exchangeable probability measure on X N in the sense of Section 2. Theorem 4.4 says that
there exists a Markov kernel µ : I → P X (equivalently, a probability measure on
P X) such that p can be written as in the right-hand side of equation (21). Evaluating this equation on a cylinder set corresponding to a sequence of measurable
subsets S1 , . . . , Sn of X gives
!
Z
n Z
Y
samp(Si |qi ) copy(dq1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ dqn |q) µ(dq)
p(S1 × · · · × Sn ) =
PX

Z

i=1
n
Y

PX

samp(Si |q) µ(dq)

=

P X i=1

Z
q(S1 ) × · · · × q(Sn ) µ(dq),

=
PX

where we used the fact that samp(S|q) = q(S). Thus, Theorem 2.1 follows from
Theorem 4.4.
Similarly, here is how Proposition 4.5 recovers the classical coincidence of exchangeable σ-algebra and tail σ-algebra up to null sets. In BorelStoch, a deterministic morphism f : X N → {0, 1} corresponds to an event in X N , and such f satisfies
the shift invariance condition if and only if the corresponding event is, up to null
sets, in the tail σ-algebra. Likewise, such f satisfies finite permutation invariance
if and only if the event is, up to null sets, in the exchangeable σ-algebra.
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Remark 4.7. Note that by making the same argument with A an arbitrary standard Borel space, one obtains a parametric version of the classical Theorem 2.1.
It says that if the exchangeable probability measure p depends measurably on a
parameter, then µ can also be chosen to depend measurably on the same parameter. This is the de Finetti theorem for exchangeable Markov kernels mentioned in
the introduction.
Remark 4.8. It is conceivable that versions of de Finetti’s Theorem applying to
larger classes of spaces, such as the result of Hewitt and Savage for exchangeable
Radon probability measures on compact Hausdorff spaces, can also be obtained
from Theorem 4.4 by instantiating it in a suitable Markov category. The recent
results of Forré [16] may be relevant here to establish the existence of conditionals.

5. Diagrammatic Proof of de Finetti’s Theorem
The overall structure of the proof is presented in Figure 1. We first present a
number of lemmas that may be useful in other contexts too. We assume throughout
that we are in a Markov category C satisfying Assumption 4.2.
Lemma 5.1 (spreadability). Let p : A → Y ⊗ X N be exchangeable in the second
factor. Then for every injective function i : N → N, we also have
Xi
=
p

(24)
p

In the concrete setting of BorelStoch, this statement reads as follows in the case
A = Y = I. Consider a probability measure p ∈ P (X N ) specifying an exchangeable
joint distribution of infinitely many random variables. If we marginalize over the
first component, then the resulting distribution is again p. In other words, if p is
exchangeable, then it is also shift-invariant. More generally, even if we marginalize
over any number of components whose indices are specified by the complement of
the image of some injective function i : N → N, the resulting distribution is still
p. The same logic can be applied in the presence of a non-trivial covariate Y and
parameter A, i.e. when p is a Markov kernel A → Y ⊗ X N .
The relevant argument was essentially already given in the proof of [19, Section 5], but we reproduce the argument here in the present more general context.
Note that this works the same way for any other infinite set in place of N (if the
relevant Kolmogorov power exists).
Proof. Since X N is the Kolmogorov power of X, it suffices to prove equation (24)
after composition with each of the infinite marginalization maps πF : X N → X F
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Lemma 5.2
(Invariant
observables)

Lemma 5.1
(Spreadability)

Proposition 4.5

Lemma 5.3
(Shift invariance of
conditionals)

Lemma 5.4
(Exchangeable
states are
conditionally iid)

De Finetti’s
Theorem for states

Parametrization
construction
[18, Section 2.2]

De Finetti’s
Theorem
(Theorem 4.4)

Figure 1. Overall structure of the proof of Theorem 4.4.
where F is a finite subset of N as before. That is, we need to prove
πF
πF
Xi
p

=

(25)
p

for each finite F ⊆ N. For any given i and F , we can find a finite permutation
σ : N → N whose action on F coincides with that of i. By definitions of X σ and
X i , this implies πF ◦ X σ = πF ◦ X i , and the claim now follows by the assumed
finite permutation invariance.
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The next lemma can be thought of as a synthetic statement about stochastic
dynamical systems where t : Θ → Θ is the dynamics, p is an invariant probability
measure, and f is an observable.
Lemma 5.2 (dynamically invariant observables). Let p : I → Θ and t : Θ → Θ
be two morphisms satisfying t p = p. If t† denotes a Bayesian inverse of t with
respect to p, then every p-a.s. deterministic f : Θ → X satisfies
f
t

=p-a.s.

f
=⇒

f

†

=p-a.s.

f

(26)

t

Before presenting the proof, let us again instantiate this for the concrete case
of BorelStoch, and in particular for X = R. Consider a standard Borel probability
space (Θ, p) and a measure-preserving Markov kernel t : Θ → Θ. A Bayesian
inverse of t is Markov kernel t† satisfying
Z
Z
t(T |θ) p(dθ) =
t† (S|θ) p(dθ)
(27)
S

T

for all measurable subsets S, T ⊆ Θ. Lemma 5.2 says that if a (deterministic)
function f : Θ → R satisfies
Z
f (θ) =
f (θ0 ) t† (dθ0 |θ),
(28)
Θ

for p-almost every θ, then it also satisfies
Z
f (θ) =
f (θ0 ) t(dθ0 |θ).

(29)

Θ

for p-almost every θ. By Lemma 5.2, if f is an observable invariant under the timereversed dynamics, then it is also preserved forward in time. One may therefore
expect this result to have further relevance for a synthetic treatment of ergodic
theory.
Proof. Using the definition of Bayesian inverses, the assumed t p = p, and the
antecedent statement in implication (26), we get
f

f

t

f

f
t†

=
p

t

f

f

=

(30)
p

p
The claim now follows by [19, Lemma 5.5] whose proof, even if originally stated
for deterministic f only, works just as well for p-a.s. deterministic f .
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We can present the proof of Proposition 4.5 now. It is worth noting that
neither Lemma 5.1 nor Lemma 5.2 use the assumption of representability of C. As
expressed in the statement of Proposition 4.5, the following proof does not require
representability either, even while making use of the previous two lemmas.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Let us argue that shift invariance as expressed by equation (23) implies finite permutation invariance as expressed by equation (22). Indeed, for any finite permutation σ : N → N, there is an integer nσ beyond which
all larger integers are fixed by σ. With s : N → N denoting the successor function introduced in the statement of Proposition 4.5, this entails σ ◦ snσ = snσ .
Therefore, we have
(31)
(X s )nσ ◦ X σ = (X s )nσ ,
where the morphism on the right-hand side effectively discards the first nσ components of X N . Thus, assuming shift invariance of f , we can infer the permutation
invariance as follows:
f

f
f

Xσ

Xσ

=

=

p

Xσ

−1

−1

(X s )nσ

p

p
(32)

f
f
s nσ

=

(X )

=
p

p
−1

In particular, the first equality holds by exchangeability of p and because X σ
−1
is a Bayesian inverse of X σ . The latter holds by virtue of the fact that X σ
σ
is deterministic and the inverse of X . The second and fourth equations in (32)
correspond to shift invariance of f applied nσ times, while the third is analogous
to the first in reverse, using equation (31) in addition.
Conversely, let us now assume finite permutation invariance of f and show that
it implies shift invariance. By the first equality of (32), we have that the morphism
f

p
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is exchangeable in the second output. Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, we also obtain
f

f

Xs

f
=

=

p

(X s )†

(33)

p
p

By Lemma 5.2, this entails

=p-a.s.

f

f
(34)
Xs

which is what we wanted to prove.



For a given exchangeable morphism p : I → X N , we now consider a conditional
p|tail : X N → X of the first output given all others, which means that it satisfies
the left equation in
p|tail
p|tail
=

=

p

(35)
p

p
while the right one follows by exchangeability of p and Lemma 5.1.
Such a tail conditional depends only on the tail of the product X N in the
following sense.
Lemma 5.3 (shift invariance of the tail conditional). If p : I → X N is exchangeable, then we have
p|tail
p|tail

=p-a.s.

(36)

Here is what the statement looks like in BorelStoch. Let p be an exchangeable
probability measure on X N , and let p|tail be a (regular) conditional of the first
component given the other ones. Denote a generic element of X N by (x1 , x2 , . . . ).
Then for each measurable subset S ⊆ X, we have that
p|tail (S|x1 , x2 , . . . ) = p|tail (S|x2 , x3 , . . . )

(37)
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holds for p-almost all sequences (x1 , x2 , . . . ) ∈ X N . Iterating this equation shows
that p|tail only depends on the tail.
Proof. By the definition of p|tail and exchangeability of p, we have
p|tail
X

p|tail

Xσ

p|tail

−1

σ

=

=
p

(38)
p

p
for any finite permutation σ : N → N. By the a.s.-compatible representability of C
(Definition 3.9), this is equivalent to
]

=p-a.s. p]|tail .

(39)

]

= p]|tail ◦ X σ ,

(40)

p|tail ◦ X σ
Since X σ is deterministic, we have
p|tail ◦ X σ

which is an instance of the naturality of (16), and conclude that the deterministic
morphism p]|tail is p-almost surely finite permutation invariant. Thus, by Proposition 4.5, it is also shift invariant. This proves the claim after composition with
the sampling map sampX .

Lemma 5.4 (exchangeable states are conditionally iid). If p : I → X N is an
exchangeable morphism, then we have

p

=

p|tail · · · p|tail

(41)

p
Concretely, in BorelStoch, Lemma 5.4 says the following. Let p be an exchangeable probability measure on X N . Then for every cylinder defined by measurable
subsets S1 , . . . , SN ⊆ X, we have
Z
p(S1 × · · · × Sn ) =
p|tail (S1 |ξ) × · · · × p|tail (Sn |ξ) p(dξ),
(42)
XN

where ξ is shorthand for a generic sequence (x1 , x2 , . . . ) ∈ X N .
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Proof. By the bijection of Definition 3.10, it is enough to prove the statement for
all finite products, i.e. to prove that
n wires
p|tail · · · p|tail
=

(43)

p
p
for every n ∈ N. Using induction, the base case n = 0 is trivial. In order to get
from n to n + 1, we use
n wires
n wires
n wires
p|tail

p|tail ··· p|tail

p|tail

p|tail ··· p|tail

···
=

Xs

Xs

p

=

p
p

n wires

n + 1 wires

p|tail ··· p|tail
=

p|tail ··· p|tail
=

p|tail

p
p

where the first step is by Lemma 5.3 and the third one by equation (35).



Parametrization construction. Lemma 5.4 allows us to prove de Finetti’s Theorem for exchangeable morphisms out of I, but our Theorem 4.4 is meant to be
applicable to exchangeable morphisms with an arbitrary domain A. In order to
make this logical transition, we interpret the statement of Lemma 5.4 in a new
Markov category CA where every morphism f : A → Y of C can be reinterpreted as
a morphism f : I → Y in CA . Specifically, we use the parametric Markov category
CA [18, Section 2.2], which is defined in terms of C and A by taking its objects to
coincide with those of C and its morphisms to be
CA (B, Y ) := C(A ⊗ B, Y ).

(44)
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In a sense, CA contains the same data as C; it is just organized differently. When
composing morphisms in CA we use the composition of C and distribute a copy of
A to each of the morphisms in the composition. The key aspect of the parametrization construction for our proof is that as long as C satisfies Assumption 4.2, so does
the parametric category CA . The arguments for conditionals and a.s.-compatible
representability have been presented in [18] as Lemma 2.10 and Lemma 3.22 respectively. Here, we also spell out the argument for Kolmogorov powers.
Lemma 5.5. If X N is a countable Kolmogorov power of X in C, then X N is also
a countable Kolmogorov power of X in the parametric Markov category CA .
Proof. Let B, Y be arbitrary objects of CA . We have the following three bijective
correspondences
f ∈ CA (B, X N ⊗ Y )

f ∈ C(A ⊗ B, X N ⊗ Y )

fF ∈ CA (B, X F ⊗ Y )




fF ∈ C(A ⊗ B, X F ⊗ Y )

where the lower two are compatible families in the same sense as in Definition 3.10.
The vertical one is natural in both B and X by assumption, while for the horizontal
ones, naturality follows from the definition of CA .
Since identities in CA correspond to identities in C with A discarded, the infinite
marginalization maps in CA are likewise given by discarding A and applying the
respective πF ∈ C(X N , X F ). In particular, the infinite marginalization maps in
CA are deterministic, which means that the countable Kolmogorov power of X in
CA indeed exists and is given by X N .

Proof of Theorem 4.4. We first consider the case A = I. Then we get
samp
p

=

p]|tail

samp
···

p]|tail

samp

···

=

samp
(45)

p]|tail
p

p

as a consequence Lemma 5.4, together with the fact that for each morphism f ,
we have f = samp ◦ f ] (see Section 3). This already has the desired form of
equation (21).
Now, for a general morphism p : A → X N , we apply this result to the parametric
Markov category CA , in which p is represented by a morphism with domain I. By
[18, Lemmas 2.10 and 3.22] and Lemma 5.5, CA satisfies our three assumptions
provided that C itself does. As is mentioned in [18, Example 3.17], the sampling
map in CA is represented by delA ⊗ samp in C. Therefore, instantiating equation
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(45) in CA gives
samp

samp

···

XN
p

=

p]|tail

(46)

p

A

in C, which is the relevant form for what we wanted to show.



Acknowledgments. We want to thank the anonymous reviewer for the very helpful suggestions. Research for the second author is supported by NSERC Discovery grant RGPIN 2017-04383, and by the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical
Physics. Research at Perimeter Institute is supported in part by the Government
of Canada through the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and by the Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Colleges
and Universities. Research for the third author is supported by the ERC grant
“BLaST – Better Language for Statistics”, and by the University of Oxford.
References
1. Alam, I.: Generalizing the de Finetti–Hewitt–Savage theorem, arXiv:2008.08754. ↑ 3
2. Alam, I.: A nonstandard proof of de Finetti’s theorem for Bernoulli random variables, J.
Stoch. Anal. 1 (2020), no. 4, Art. 15, 18, arXiv:1912.02784. ↑ 3
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Forré, P.: Transitional conditional independence, arXiv:2104.11547. ↑ 16
Fritz, T.: A synthetic approach to Markov kernels, conditional independence and theorems
on sufficient statistics, Adv. Math. 370, (2020) 107239, arXiv:1908.07021. ↑ 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11
Fritz, T. and Gonda, T. and Perrone, P. and Rischel, E. F.: Representable Markov categories and comparison of statistical experiments in categorical probability, (2020), arXiv:
02010.07416. ↑ 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 22, 23
Fritz, T. and Rischel, E.: Infinite products and zero-one laws in categorical probability,
Compositionality 2 (2020), no. 3, compositionality-journal.org/papers/compositionality-2-3.
↑ 4, 6, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18
Giry, M.: A Categorical Approach to Probability Theory, Categorical aspects of topology and
analysis, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 915, (1982), doi.org/10.1007/BFb0092872. ↑ 5
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